Helena Schrader's Historical Fiction

Dr. Helena P. Schrader is the winner of more than 20 literary accolades. For a complete list of her awards see: http://helenapschrader.com

Helena is represented by Laurie Blum Guest at the Re-Naissance Agency.

For readers tired of clichés and cartoons, award-winning novelist Helena P. Schrader offers nuanced insight to historical events and figures based on sound research and an understanding of human nature. Her complex and engaging characters bring history back to life as a means to better understand ourselves.

Friday, September 24, 2021

British and American Women Pilots in WWII

 The Second World War was the first in which women played a role in aviation. Russian women flew combat missions as bomber and fighter pilots, but in Great Britain and the United States the role of women pilots was supportive rather than direct. The similarities and contrasts between the British and American experience are, however, striking. Below is a summary taken from my comparative study published 15 years ago. 


 American woman pilot in the cockpit of a B-17 (above)

(Photo courtesy of the National Archives, Washington, No 342-FH-4A05339)

An British woman pilot preparing to fly a Spitfire (below)  

(Photo courtesy of Diana Barnato Walker)


In the U.K. women flew with the Air Transport Auxiliary (ATA), which was founded almost immediately after the start of WWII by senior executives of British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) to employ pilots not fit for military service in supporting roles for the RAF and Fleet Air Arm (FAA). Although it became the sole ferrying organization of the British armed forces, it responded flexibly to other requests and also provided air ambulance, VIP transport and cargo service on an ad hoc basis.

From the start, the ATA was an organization dedicated to providing services, not proving a point, and it was open to both men and women. Indeed, through out its existence, men pilots out-numbered women pilots by a significant margin. For example, the first pilots of the organization were 30 men and 8 women. At it’s peak in 1944, the ATA employed nearly 700 pilots of which only a little over 100 were women. (Source: The Forgotten Pilots. Lettice Curtis (who was herself an ATA pilot). Appendix 1.)

In the United States, in contrast, women flew with the WAFS and/or WASP. Both of the organizations were established as women-only organizations, and the WASP was established more to demonstrate that women could be taught to fly as well as men as to fill any explicit need or shortage identified by the USAAF. Indeed, the USAAF consistently denied the need for training women pilots at all.

WASP in classroom training at Avenger Field in Sweetwater, TX (Photo courtesy of the National Archives, Washington, No 342-FH-4A05376)

The ATA was established by aviation professionals, and initially only accepted pilots with 500 hours of solo time. By the end of 1940, the needs of the organization were so great that the recruiting requirements were reduced to just 50 hours solo, and by 1942 the first candidates without any flying experience were accepted into the organization’s training program. The latter had started in 1941, when the reduction in flying hours required for application had been instituted. Pilots with just 50 hours solo needed additional training to fulfill the tasks assigned.

Rather than duplicating RAF or airline training, however, the ATA inventively developed a pilot training program designed to train pilots precisely for the tasks required by the ATA in a minimum amount of time. Pilots were first trained only on light, training aircraft and then put to work ferrying these aircraft to RAF training establishments. In doing the work, the pilots were already earning their keep, contributing directly to the war effort (relieving RAF pilots from ferrying), and also gaining flying time, experience and confidence.

An ATA pilot in a training aircraft. (Photo courtesy of Michael Fahie)

Once they had fully mastered these aircraft, the ATA pilots (whether men or women) advanced to more powerful single-engine aircraft including fighters, and step-by-step at their own pace to twin-engine aircraft and eventually heavy bombers. At no time were ATA pilots trained on aerobatics, air gunnery, formation flying or other military training irrelevant to ferrying and transport service. Indeed, they were given only minimal training on instrument flying, as ATA pilots were expected to fly “visual.” By keeping the topics of training to the minimum, training time was significantly reduced.

Furthermore, by allowing the pilots to progress at their own pace, no pilots were forced beyond their capabilities. There was no need for all pilots to qualify on all classes of aircraft, a policy that ensured all pilots contributed according to their abilities, reducing accidents and losses. Notably this training scheme was evolved and initially managed by some of the world's finest flying instructors -- instructors that had previously been with the British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC).

An British woman pilot in cockpit of a Sterling four-engine bomber (Photo courtesy of Maidenhead Heritage Centre)

The WASP, in contrast, singularly failed to develop a satisfying training program. Training was put in the hands of a civilian contractor of dubious quality, and two separate USAAF inspections of the WASP training facility identified and catalogued myriad inadequacies in the WASP training program, but no corrective actions were undertaken.

Furthermore, the contractor responsible for training rigidly and mindlessly followed the standard USAAF training program (probably at the insistence of the WASP leadership or the USAAF itself). As a result, American women pilot-candidates were subjected to a lengthy course cluttered with utterly superfluous training elements such as mathematics, aerobatics, and use of the Norton Bomb Site -- although no one ever envisaged the women graduates serving as bombadiers on USAAF combat missions.

Above WASP training on the bombsite (Photo courtesy of the National Archives, Washington, No 342-FH-4A05355)

At great expense to the American taxpayer, the WASP training institution at Avenger Field in Texas turned out pilots who on graduation had their wings yet still needed further training before they could contribute to the war effort. Thus while British women pilots were contributing to the war effort after only a few months, the WASP pilots took nine to ten months just to earn their wings. At that point, they still needed specialized training on service aircraft. "Pursuit" training was four weeks long, B-26 training nine weeks and B-17 training twelve weeks long. In short, even the best women pilots were in training for a year or more before starting to contribute to the war effort.

However, because of the substandard level of training offered at Avenger Field, most graduates failed to live up to expectations, fueling rather than diminishing existing prejudices against the concept of women military pilots. Overall, only a tiny percentage of the 1,074 women who passed through WASP training saw active service in any capacity before the decision was made to disband the organization altogether.

WASP pilot and copilot in the cockpit of a B-17 (Photo courtesy of the National Archives, Washington, No 342-FH-4A05519)

PLEASE NOTE! I am NOT suggesting that the American women were in any way inherently less capable or less dedicated than the British women. On the contrary, many American women flew very successfully with the ATA. Women pilots on both sides of the Atlantic consistently demonstrated high levels of competence at least equal to that of male pilots of comparable experience. Indeed, their service record with respect to patience and reliability was notably better than that of male pilots. The women in both countries demonstrated that women could fly the most modern aircraft of their age, (including the first jets in the UK), and their flying safety record was above average in both the U.K. and the U.S.

However, in the course of the war, the women with the ATA steadily won the same privileges and status as their male counterparts. They wore the same uniforms, underwent the same training at the same centralized flying school, and performed the same duties as their male colleagues as they qualified successively on the classes of aircraft from training bi-planes to four-engine bombers. From 1943 onwards, they broke ground by being awarded equal pay for equal work at a time when other women's auxiliaries (such as the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF)) were not. Last but not least, women in the ATA were promoted on merit and could exercise command authority over male colleagues.

Women pilots of the ATA (Photo courtesy of Ann Wood Kelly)

The American women pilots, in contrast, were segregated in an exclusively women's organization. They trained separately at a training base set up exclusively for them and managed, as noted above, by a sub-standard civilian contractor. Even on completing training, they were expressly denied the same uniform, status, rank, privileges, pay and benefits of male pilots engaged in the same activities — whether ferrying aircraft, towing targets or gliders. (The male pilots were all members of the USAAF.) Indeed, the WASP were not even entitled to disability, pension or death benefits in the event of an accident, resulting in the absurd situation in which women killed in the same aircraft as male crew members were denied the military honors accorded the men who had died with them. Separate is NOT equal!

The illusion of militarization: they could march, but not get a pension, disability or military funeral. (Photo courtesy of the National Archives, Washington, No 342-FH-4A05676)

Throughout the war, the women in the ATA were recognized and praised both officially and publicly for their contribution to the war effort. Five women and 31 male ATA pilots won the MBE. Four women ATA pilots and two male colleagues earned the BEM. One woman Flight Captain received a Commendation alongside five male ATA officers, and two women ATA pilots along with 16 male ATA pilots received the King’s Commendation for Valuable Service in the Air.

The WASP, in contrast, were first glamorized and then demonized. The women could not and did not receive any form or honors. On the contrary, they were sent home before the war was even over, and treated like an embarrassment by the government and nation that had recruited them.

Even more shocking, because of the incompetence of the WASP management, women were sometimes left without pay for months on end. Members were arbitrarily shifted from one assignment to another, preventing the women from gaining experience, competence and confidence in any particular job. They had no uniform for most of their existence, and when a uniform was eventually issued, it highlighted their "otherness" rather than furthering integration and acceptance by the USAAF.

Worst of all, however, the real contributions of competent women pilots were over-shadowed by the bureaucratic back-biting and games played by the WASP leadership. Even USAAF commanders who valued the contributions of individual American women pilots, viewed the organization as a headache. When the WASP became the target of a hostile Congressional investigation, the women pilots found few supporters and so the WASP was rapidly scrapped because it had become a public embarrassment.

A comprehensive comparison of the experiences of women pilots in the U.S. and the U.K. was the subject of my book Sisters in Arms: The Women who Flew in WWII [Pen & Sword, 2006]

Sisters in Arms: British & American Women Pilots During World War II by [Helena Page Schrader]

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Friday, September 17, 2021

Footnote to History: The German Aristocracy and the Resistance to Hitler

 One curious feature of the German Resistance to Hitler as the disproportionately high number or aristocrats involved.  Today I reflect on why.


Peter Count Yorck von Wartenberg

The German aristocracy was disproportionately well represented in the military resistance and conspiracy against Hitler.  For example, the most famous would-be assassin was Claus Count Stauffenberg.  Others who volunteered for suicide-attacks against Hitler were Axel Baron von dem Bussche, Georg Baron von Boeselager, and Rudolf-Christoph Baron von Gersdorff — to name just a few.  Counts Moltke and Yorck von Wartenburg, and Count Schulenburg were important civilian figures in the conspiracy. Many lesser noblemen were also highly significant figures, for example Henning von Tresckow and Carl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel.  I could list literally hundreds of German aristocrats who were members of the Resistance.

Helmut James Count Moltke

The question is: Why was the German aristocracy so prominent in the Resistance?  There were two factors:

First, the only resistance group with a chance of successfully bringing down the Nazi regime was that group that controlled some degree of force —i.e. could command troops, had access to explosives and the apparatus of government. This meant the officer corps of the army. While the Communists and Socialists, while staunchly anti-Hilter, they also had a pacifist tradition and so were hardly represented in the Officer Corps at all. In contrast, the aristocracy had for generations been the very backbone of the German officer corps.

Thus the aristocracy dominated the military resistance, that strand of the resistance that made the assassination attempts and carried out the coup attempt.

The second reason for the prominence of the German aristocracy in the German resistance is more subtle but no less significant. In the first half of the last century, the aristocracy in Germany firmly believed that a title of nobility brought with it an obligation to lead and to take responsibility for the fate of the nation.  

While Socialist and Communist resistance groups depended on organizations and were thus largely helpless once their organizations were shattered by the Nazis, the aristocracy’s resistance was individual.  The majority of those who had formerly voted for the leftist parties became disoriented once these parties were banned and so they were often co-opted by Hitlers early successes—by jobs, higher standards of living, victory.  

The aristocracy, in contrast, saw the need to rescue the nation from misgovernment as their hereditary duty—a personal obligation completely disconnected from party affiliation or the existence of an organization.

The German Resistance to Hitler was the subject of my PhD thesis. At the time I was the first Western academic granted access to some military archives and documents in what was then still "East Germany." In addition, I conducted interviews with over one hundred survivors of Nazi Germany, both supporters and opponents of the regime. The research culminated in a published dissertation and, later, an English-language biography of General Friederich Olbricht based on the dissertation. It also inspired me to write a novel about the German Resistance, which was recently re-released in ebook format under the title: "Traitors for the Sake of Humanity." Find out more and read reviews of "Traitors" at the publisher's website: Cross Seas Press.



Friday, September 10, 2021

London can Take It -- The Luftwaffe attacks London

 As the first week of September drew to a close, the Luftwaffe believed it was winning the war of attrition with the RAF -- but at a higher cost and a slower pace than anticipated. Crews were tired, tempers on edge and the time for an invasion was running out. Hitler extended the deadline for the invasion to September 21 to give the Luftwaffe more time to “soften up” English defenses, but he also expressed doubts about the Luftwaffe’s successes. Goering scented political trouble. He wanted an alternative to “more of the same.” An attack on London seemed just the thing.

The decision to switch the focus of the Nazi air offensive from RAF Fighter Command to the British capital was not made flippantly. The commander of Luftflotte 3, Generalfeldmarshall Hugo Sperrle opposed the move vehemently. He believed the German fighters were greatly exaggerating their claims (whether intentionally or unintentionally) and he doubted that Fighter Command on was on its last legs. He believed that the assaults on the RAF itself should remain the primary objective of the air offensive.

His counterpart in Luftflotte 2, Generalfeldmarshall Albert Kesselring, wasn’t convinced the RAF was broken either, but he noted that (unlike the Dutch, Belgians, and French) the RAF was not allowing itself to be destroyed on the ground. That is, he was fully cognizant of the fact that the Luftwaffe had caught very few RAF fighter aircraft on the ground and drew the incorrect conclusion that the Luftwaffe’s attacks on RAF fighter stations were not terribly effective. He noted further that the RAF possessed a plenitude of airfields beyond the range of his fighters and — since he could not afford to send in unescorted bombers — that meant these fields were de facto immune to attack. Kesselring believed that the RAF defend itself from destruction by pulling their aircraft back to stations beyond the range of the Luftwaffe.

In other words, German ignorance of the vital role of the Sector Operations Rooms at the Sector Control Stations misled the Luftwaffe into underestimating the effect their concentrated attacks on key (albeit not all) RAF airfields had had. This miscalculation, combined with the over-estimation of the losses the RAF suffered in the air, led Kesselring to the conclusion that the Luftwaffe needed to concentrate on a target that the RAF would be forced to defend in the air. The British capital seemed ideal for this purpose.

Goering, however, was probably swayed not by Kesselring’s military arguments so much as by political considerations. He had bragged that the British could not bomb Berlin — but they had. Although the physical damage was nominal, the damage to his reputation was more substantial. “People” were making jokes about him. Far more serious, however, was the fact that Jodl had long advocated an all-out attack on London.  In the absence of British pleas for peace negotiations, Jodl sounded more and more convincing. Goering was at risk of losing Hitler’s trust, and in an authoritarian dictatorship the consequences of losing the dictator’s trust were dire.

The bottom line was that Hitler wanted an attack on London. His patience with the stubborn British — or at least Churchill’s government — had worn out. He might have once admired the British Empire, but he detested being flouted in anything. The fact that an attack on London would contribute little to creating the conditions for an invasion did not interest him. He had never been all that keen on the invasion anyway. There was more than one way to skin a cat. If the invasion was called off, Hitler presumed he could starve Britain with his U-boats while pulverizing her cities from the air. Why waste ground troops he needed to subdue the Soviet Union?

On September 4, 1940, Hitler had promised:

 “And should the Royal Air Force drop two thousand, or three thousand, or four thousand kilograms of bombs, then we will now drop 150,000; 180,00; 230,000; 300,000; 400,000; yes, one million kilograms in a single night. And should they declare they will greatly increase their attacks on our cities, then we will erase their cities!

With the dictator so committed to terror bombing, Goering didn’t really have any choice.

On September 7, Goering set out to show Hitler, the German people, and — almost incidentally — the British, just what the Luftwaffe could do. In a maximum effort, 348 bombers escorted by 617 fighters were launched on a single late-afternoon raid. Goering and his field marshals watched through binoculars from the Pas de Calais while picnicking on fine food and selected wines.

The attack caught Air Vice Marshal Park flat-footed. He was himself away at a meeting with Dowding and others. His controllers, anticipating attacks on airfields, kept waiting for the large force to split up into smaller raids. The first squadrons to make visual contact with the raid had never seen anything like it and could hardly believe their eyes. Amazed though they were, a section of three aircraft was detailed to “deal” with the 600 fighters while the remaining nine aircraft attacked the bombers. Naturally, other squadrons were soon sent into the fray as well, but they arrived piecemeal, one or two at a time. The RAF pilots could not see their comrades coming from different stations on different vectors and attacking in a staggered fashion. They were left feeling that they — a squadron or two — were utterly alone against this gigantic air armada.

The Luftwaffe had the same feeling. The RAF did not come up in hoards or swarms, but instead nibbled at the fringes more like irritable gnats than the vicious eagles they had been the weeks before. That is, until they reached London itself. Then more aircraft appeared and a great dog-fight involving close to 1,000 aircraft altogether developed, but it was a fighter-fighter engagement for the most part. Meanwhile the bombers had set the London docks on fire, destroyed a gas works and shattered hundreds of buildings. At the end of the day, the Luftwaffe lost only fourteen bombers, sixteen 109s and seven 110s. That didn’t seem so bad. All the intelligence about RAF attrition appeared confirmed.

Furthermore, with the target now the huge city of London, precision bombing was a luxury. All that mattered was delivering Hitler’s message of vengeance and obliteration until the British surrendered. The Luftwaffe started a round-the-clock bombing offensive, with night as well as daylight raids whenever weather permitted. For the next week, bombing by night and cloud, the Luftwaffe inflicted damage and encountered comparatively little opposition as interceptions went awry in cloud. The impression of a weakening RAF was reinforced.

On Sunday September 15, conditions appeared perfect for a new massive daylight raid on London — a final effort before Hitler decided yea-or-nay about an invasion of England. The Luftwaffe confidently mustered its full strength again and sent the raid in. The RAF, however, knew where they were headed this time. There was no need to hold squadron’s back to protect airfields and radar. Instead, Park timed his interceptions to first peel the German escorts away from the bombers with high level, predominantly Spitfire attacks, and then sent the remaining (mostly Hurricane) squadrons in to take out the bombers after their escorts were fully engaged with the Spitfires. Meanwhile, 12 Group had been alerted of the incoming raid and had time to assemble a “Big Wing” of five squadrons just north of London. By the time the last German aircraft of this raid had landed back at base, it became clear that the Luftwaffe had lost one-quarter of the bombers deployed and more than 12% of the fighters. But this raid had only been the “prelude” to the real strike.

The second raid of the day was composed of 114 bombers escorted by 340 fighters. While smaller than the raid of September 7, the fighter/bomber ratio was higher.  AVM Park answered with every squadron he had and then some — 10 Group put up squadrons over 11 Group airfields and 12 Group was asked again to provide a Big Wing over London. BY 14:35 every available RAF squadron was in the air — with PM Churchill at Uxbridge watching the entire show. By evening the RAF was claiming 185 Luftwaffe aircraft for the loss of 28 fighters. Actual Luftwaffe losses were 56. It was now the RAF that was wildly exaggerating their claims, particularly in inexperienced squadrons and those in the Big Wing of 12 Group. But the pilot losses were markedly different. The 81 Luftwaffe airmen had been killed, 63 captured and 31 returned to base wounded. The effective loss to the Luftwaffe was 144 killed and captured. In contrast, 12 RAF pilots were killed and one captured after bailing out into the Channel and being picked up by Luftwaffe air/sea rescue. Even with respect to wounded, the RAF had escaped lightly with only 14 casualties.

The returning bomber crews were shaken. Individual units had sustained casualty rates of 30% or more, the worst being 60%. They were shaken too by head-on attacks that appeared suicidal and ramming that was equally so. The RAF did not look beaten to the pilots and aircrew of the Luftwaffe.

But in the jovial and congenial atmosphere of Goering’s hunting lodge Karin Hall, all was still well. The RAF had only managed to ‘scrape together’ so many aircraft by denuding the rest of the country and concentrating their fighters around London. They had thrown untrained pilots into the fight who didn’t even know how to shoot — which was why they tried ramming their enemy. If only the days were longer and the weather more stable, the Luftwaffe would have air superiority in a day or two. Fortunately for Goering and his commanders, the weather was bad and Hitler postponed “indefinitely” the invasion of Great Britain. The RAF had won the Battle of Britain — the Luftwaffe Leadership just didn’t know it yet.

Where Eagles Never Flew opens with the Battle of France and goes on to show the Battle of Britain, in all its phases, from both sides of the Channel. It does so by following the fate of German characters as well as British ones. The British characters are members of the fictional No. 606 (Hurricane) Squadron based at Tangmere. The German characters are the pilots and women auxiliaries of a Me109 Gruppe based in Northern France.  Where Eagles Never Flew is the winner of the Hemingway Award for 20th Century Wartime Fiction, a Maincrest Media Award for Historical Fiction, and more. Find out more about Where Eagles Never Flew at:  https://crossseaspress.com/where-eagles-never-flew or watch a video teaser at: Eagles Video Teaser

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Friday, September 3, 2021

Western Allied Response to the German Resistance

Although the German Resistance to Hitler was a loose conspiracy based on shared abhorrence of Hitler, his policies and his regime, they did not operate in a vacuum. Hitler's government started the most devastating war in human history and the three greatest powers on earth buried (at least temporarily) their differences in order to defeat Hitler's Germany. At various times, members of the German military resistance sought to establish contact with the Western allies -- and it wasn't all about getting a "better deal" than "Unconditional Surrender." 

Tragically, no one was listening.

The German anti-Nazis who attempted to kill Hitler and topple his regime on July 20, 1944 made various attempts to inform the Western Allies of their existence and get assurances that, if they succeeded in removing Hitler and establishing an interim government, the Western Allies would negotiate with them.  The first such attempt was made in the lead-up to the Sudeten Crisis in 1938.  Via the Vatican, the British government was informed about the possibility of a coup to prevent Hitler from invading the Sudetenland. However, the British government was not interested in aiding German generals against Hitler, and at that time even preferred Hitler to a government run, even temporarily, by the German General Staff.  It was a tragic misjudgment.

In the lull between the invasion of Poland and the start of the offensive in the West, one member of the Resistance, Hans Oster, warned the Dutch of the impending violation of Dutch neutrality—a move that has made him very controversial in Germany to this day.  But the Dutch didn't take the warnings seriously and were caught off guard despite the warning.

Hans Oster

Later, the Allies were far too committed to Stalin to think of seriously negotiating with a post-Hitler government.  In consequence, they responded to all overtures with non-committal answers.  Some members of the conspiracy hoped nevertheless that once they had killed Hitler and seized power — i.e. had proved their effectiveness and presented the Allies with a concrete opportunity to stop the loss of life in the West — they might be able to effect at least a ceasefire in the West. Some of the conspirators were willing to open the Western Front to the Anglo-Americans and invite them into Berlin while holding the Russian Front. 

The German Resistance to Hitler was the subject of my PhD thesis. At the time I was the first Western academic granted access to some military archives and documents in what was then still "East Germany." In addition, I conducted interviews with over one hundred survivors of Nazi Germany, both supporters and opponents of the regime. The research culminated in a published dissertation and, later, an English-language biography of General Friederich Olbricht based on the dissertation. It also inspired me to write a novel about the German Resistance, which was recently re-released in ebook format under the title: "Traitors for the Sake of Humanity." Find out more and read reviews of "Traitors" at the publisher's website: Cross Seas Press.